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Abstract 
FƌŝĞŶĚƐŽĨƚŚĞĂƌƚŚ ?Ɛ ?&Ž ? ‘ŝŐƐŬ ?campaign played a critical role establishing the path-
breaking UK Climate Change Act (CCA) 2008. FoE exploited the window of opportunity that 
opened in climate politics during 2006, first to win cross-party support for the Bill and then to 
strengthen its content. It then rolled-out the  ‘dŚĞŝŐƐŬ ?ĂĐƌŽƐƐƵƌŽƉĞ, helped by an 
innovative collaborative seminar programme with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The 
Multiple Streams Framework is used to identify FoE as an effective policy entrepreneur shaping 
the agenda-setting process. This contributes to the policy entrepreneurship literature where 
there are relatively few examples of effective collective entrepreneurship by environmental 
NGOs, and makes an original empirical contribution through a detailed analytical narrative 
about a remarkably successful ENGO campaign. Qualitative methodology is employed, drawing 
on public and private documentary sources and interviews with key campaigners, politicians 
and officials involved in climate policymaking.  
Keywords: Climate Change Act; climate policy; The Big Ask; Friends of the Earth; policy 
entrepreneur; Multiple Streams Framework 
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&ƌŝĞŶĚƐŽĨƚŚĞĂƌƚŚ ?Ɛ(FoE) campaign,  ‘The ŝŐƐŬ ?, calling for a climate change law was one of 
the most successful recent campaigns by a UK environmental non-governmental organization 
(ENGO).  ‘The Big Ask ? was officially launched in May 2005 and within 18 months the Labour 
Government had announced plans for far-reaching climate change legislation. When 
announcing the proposed legislation, the Secretary of State for the Environment, David 
Miliband, explicitly acknowledged ƚŚĂƚ ‘Friends of the Earth have played a big role in pressing 
the case for action on climate change. Today's Bill is a big step forward in tackling climate 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞĂŶĚǁĞǁŝůůǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵĂŶĚŵĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌƐƚŽŵĂŬĞƐƵƌĞŝƚǁŽƌŬƐ ? ? ?&ƌŝĞŶĚƐŽĨƚŚĞ
Earth 2006). Two more years of campaigning to strengthen the original Bill followed before the 
Climate Change Act (CCA) 2008 became law. Thus  ‘dŚĞŝŐƐŬ ?ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽthe introduction 
of legislation that, by enshrining ambitious greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets in 
law, backed by innovative five-year carbon budgets and an independent Climate Change 
Committee (CCC), represented not just a radical transformation of UK climate policy, but was 
seen globally as a path-breaking piece of legislation since used by several countries as a model 
for their own legislation. 
Although  ‘dŚĞŝŐƐŬ ?has been examined in passing in the wider context of UK climate 
and energy policy (Rutter et al 2012; Lockwood 2013; Carter and Jacobs 2014; Lorenzoni and 
Benson 2014) there has been only limited analysis of the campaign itself.
1
 Here, we provide a 
detailed examination of the campaign, including the first account of the effort by &Ž ?ƐƐŝƐƚĞƌ
groups ƚŽƌŽůůŽƵƚ ‘dŚĞŝŐƐŬ ?across Europe, encompassing a collaborative seminar 
programme with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). It examines why the campaign 
was successful  in achieving its primary aim of a strong Climate Change Act and why the 
ambitious aim of rolling-ŽƵƚ ‘dŚĞŝŐƐŬ ?ĂĐƌŽƐƐƵƌŽƉĞƉƌŽǀĞĚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚĂůƐŽ
analysing why FoE was unable to build on the momentum generated by the successful  climate 
campaign. A conceptual approach based on the public policy agenda-setting literature is used, 
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ<ŝŶŐĚŽŶ ?Ɛ(1995) Multiple Streams Framework (MSF), which is used to identify the 
critical policy entrepreneurial role played by FoE in coupling the problem, politics and policy 
windows to make radical policy change possible. We thus contribute to the burgeoning 
literature on policy entrepreurship where there are surprisingly few examples of successful 
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collective entrepreneurship by NGOs; specifically, rather than focus on the entrepreneurial 
activities of canny individuals, we show how FoE as an organisation played a key 
entrepreneurial role. In so doing, we also make an important empirical contribution by 
providing a detailed analytical narrative about a remarkably successful ENGO campaign. In the 
unstable political environment surrounding Brexit ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞh< ?ƐŐƌĞĞŶůŽďďǇŵŽďŝůŝƐŝŶŐƚŽ
defend existing environmental protection laws, policies and institutions, it is particularly timely 
ƚŽƌĞĨůĞĐƚŽŶƚŚĞĨĂĐƚŽƌƐƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨ ‘dŚĞŝŐƐŬ ?.   
The next section outlines the Multiple Streams Framework, which is then used in the 
following sections to ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ&ŽĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚŽĨ ‘dŚĞŝŐƐŬ ?, to frame the 
account of  ‘dŚĞŝŐƐŬ ? campaign, and then to analysis the factors shaping the success of the 
campaign. The study employs a qualitative methodology using public documentary sources, 
internal FoE reports on the campaign, interviews with members of FoE campaign team
2
 and 
material from a wider set of around 20 interviews with key actors closely involved in climate 
policymaking circles during the period 2006-2008.  
  
Achieving policy change 
ENGOs have limited capacity to exercise influence over the policy agenda: as relatively weak 
actors in the environmental policy arena they are usually in the position of reacting to events 
rather than shaping them. They often appear to be at the merĐǇŽĨ ‘ŝƐƐƵĞĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĐǇĐůĞƐ ?
(Downs 1972) when public and media interest latches briefly onto one issue before lurching off 
in pursuit of another. Downs argued that these temporary cycles of public fascination with an 
issue produced little long-lasting policy impact, but others claim that the establishment of new 
institutions, programmes and policies often coincides ǁŝƚŚǁŚĂƚŽǁŶƐĐĂůůƐƚŚĞ ‘ĂůĂƌŵĞĚ
ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞďǇƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?at the peak of the attention cycle (Peters and Hogwood 
1985). The challenge for ENGOs is to exploit these intermittent cycles of interest by shaping the 
policy agenda in order to deliver measures that continue to function long after attention to the 
issue has moved on elsewhere (Peters and Hogwood 1985, Baumgartner and Jones 2009).  
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One major contribution in the agenda-setting literature that tries to explain how and 
when significant policy change will occur is the Multiple Streams Framework developed by John 
Kingdon (1995). This dynamic model of the policy process identifies three independent streams: 
problems, policies, politics. The problem stream concerns public matters that require attention, 
although they may or may not be identified as important.  The policy stream includes proposals 
for change that are claimed to solve the problems identified in the problem stream. The politics 
stream encompasses those processes  W public opinion, election results, pressure group activity 
 W that help shape how politicians, the media and other opinion-formers perceive public 
problems and view potential solutions. Kingdon argues that these streams operate   
independently, but there are moments when compelling problems or political events open up 
 ‘ƉŽůŝĐǇǁŝŶĚŽǁƐ ? W opportunities for policy advocates to push their pet solutions to a particular 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?,ĞƌĞ<ŝŶŐĚŽŶŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐĂŬĞǇƌŽůĞĨŽƌ ‘ƉŽůŝĐǇĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌƐ ? ǁŚŽ ‘ĐŽƵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞƐƚƌĞĂŵƐ
ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ P ‘ƚŚĞǇŚŽŽŬƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐƚŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŵŽŵĞŶƚƵŵ ?ĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů 
events to policy prŽďůĞŵƐ Q ?tŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨĂŶĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌ ?ƚŚĞůŝŶŬŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ
ƐƚƌĞĂŵƐŵĂǇŶŽƚƚĂŬĞƉůĂĐĞ ? ?<ŝŶŐĚŽŶ ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ?Kingdon Ɛ broad definition of policy 
entrepreneurs ĂƐďĞŝŶŐ ‘ŝŶŽƌŽƵƚŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶĞůĞĐƚĞĚŽƌĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ
groups or research organizĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?<ŝŶŐĚŽŶ ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?certainly encompasses an ENGO such 
as FoE. Yet, strangely, the literature on policy entrepreneurship, which has been profoundly 
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇ<ŝŶŐĚŽŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐrelatively few examples of ENGOs.3 Moreover, the 
policy entrepreneurship literature tends to study individual entrepreneurs rather than 
organisations operating collectively in an entrepreneurial way. Here,  we argue that FoE as an 
organisation (rather than any key individual within it) successfully played the role of policy 
entrepreneur ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ‘dŚĞŝŐƐŬ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶby providing a policy solution and helping couple 
the three streams together.  
 
ŽŶƚĞǆƚĨŽƌ ?dŚĞŝŐƐŬ ? ?ŽŵƉůĂĐĞŶƚClimate Policy  
When FoE conceived the idea of  ‘The Big Ask ? in 2004, climate change was not a major issue in 
UK politics, although the issue was attracting growing attention.
4
 In MSF terms, within the 
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problem stream the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (2001) had presented new and stronger evidence of a close link between increased 
global temperatures and human activities. In  ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŚŝĞĨ^ĐŝĞŶƚŝfic Advisor, 
David King, observed that the science now indicated that a global emissions stabilization target 
of 450ppm CO2 only was probably necessary, suggesting that the existing Government targets 
based on a 550ppm CO2 only target were inadequate (King personal interview, February 2013). 
Yet, it was increasingly apparent that the Government was struggling to achieve its existing 
modest targets, especially as, after a decade of decline, GHG emissions had levelled out. 
Although the UK was on course to meet its Kyoto Protocol commitment of reducing GHGs by at 
least 12.5% below the 1990 baseline over the period 2008-2012, it seemed likely to miss the 
Labour 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ tougher 2010 domestic targets of reducing CO2 emissions by 20% below 
baseline and for 10% of electricity to be generated from renewable sources (ENDS Report 2004, 
No.359).  
Yet little was happening within the policy stream. The UK had achieved impressive 
reductions in GHG emissions during the 1990s as an unintended consequence of the 
Conservative gŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛliberalisation ŽĨƚŚĞĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐŝƚǇƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚůĞĚƚŽĂ ‘ĚĂƐŚĨŽƌŐĂƐ ? 
that saw gas-fired plants replace coal-fired power stations. This success probably contributed to 
a degree of complacency within the Labour government, even though the RCEP had in 2000 
identified  ‘ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŽĨĂŚŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐůŝŵĂƚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ? ?ZW ? ? ? ? ?
p.80) and called for a tougher target of a 60% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2050. The 
government eventually adopted this higher target in 2003, and introduced measures such as 
the Climate Change Levy imposed on business energy use and a Renewables Obligation to 
encourage renewable energy, although their impact was limited by actions that would increase 
emissions such as an effective freeze on petrol duty and support for the expansion of the 
aviation industry. In short, despite struggling to meet its own emission reduction targets, the 
Labour government showed little interest in significantly strengthening domestic climate policy. 
Within the politics stream the obvious general explanation for this complacency was the 
low salience of environmental issues. Furthermore, two recent events had made the Labour 
leadership extremely cautious about adopting progressive climate policies. First, when the 
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Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, proposed a new Climate Change Levy in 1999 he 
was subjected to an extremely hostile, well-organized business lobby demanding that his 
proposals be watered down, a bruising experience for someone keen to be regarded as 
business-friendly. Soon after, protests about fuel prices led by hauliers and farmers dried up 
petrol pumps in September 2000, brought the country to a virtual standstill, and caused panic 
within the government (Blair 2010, p.291-297). Yet the Labour government came under no 
political pressure from the Conservatives to be tougher on climate change; indeed, under 
William Hague ?ƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ they supported the fuel protesters, promised to abolish the Climate 
Change Levy and generally showed little interest in the issue. 
However, in 2004 things began to stir. David King attracted huge publicity for his claim 
in a Science article that climate change posed a more serious threat to the world than terrorism 
(King 2004). Blair, in a speech in September, urged business leaders to take action on climate 
change, which he announced would be high on the agenda at the July 2005 G8 conference at 
Gleneagles and a priority during ƚŚĞh< ?ƐWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇŽĨƚŚĞhin 2005 (Blair 2004). These 
events would be preceded in February 2005 by a scientific conference in Exeter ŽŶ ‘ǀŽŝĚŝŶŐ
ĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐůŝŵĂƚĞŚĂŶŐĞ ?, sponsored by DEFRA.  
This discussion of the three streams sets the context in which FoE decided to launch 
 ‘dhe Big Ask ? campaign. To summarize, although there was little activity in the policy stream or 
any real sense of urgency in policy circles to act on climate change, there was sufficient 
instability and movement in the problem and politics streams to suggest that a window of 
opportunity for policy change might emerge soon. 
 The Big Idea  
The idea of a Climate Change Bill was initiated by Friends of the Earth through  ‘The Big Ask ? 
campaign. The idea emerged in an ad-hoc conversation in late 2004 in a stairwell in the FoE 
offices in London between Bryony Worthington (then FoE climate campaigner) and Martyn 
Williams (then FoE parliamentary campaigner).  The backdrop was the worsening problem of 
ĐůŝŵĂƚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂĐǇŽĨƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?ƐtŽƌƚŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ
recalls:  
7 
 
/ǁŽƌŬĞĚŽŶƚŚĞh< ?ƐĐůŝŵĂƚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ - ƚŚĞǇ ?ĚŚĂĚĂfew by then - and they were 
pretty woeful. I was into the numbers of climate change so I was tracking the annual 
emissions and saw ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐũƵƐƚŶŽƚƌĞŶĚĂŶǇŵŽƌĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐƚŚĞǇ ?ĚďĞĞŶĨĂůůŝŶŐ
steadily in the 1990s, from 1997 onwards it started to just bounce around and there was 
no discernible trend down, and yet we had these glossy strategies that were supposed 
ƚŽďĞĚŽŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚŝƚ ?^Ž/ũƵƐƚŐŽƚǀĞƌǇĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚĂŶĚƐĂŝĚǁĞ ?ǀĞŐŽƚƚŽ
change the way we do this. (Worthington, interview, 21 March 2012). 
The innovative idea that emerged ĂƐƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨ ‘dŚĞŝŐƐŬ ?was the notion of the 
legally binding carbon budget:   
I had this idea that we needed to adopt what Kyoto is, which is a carbon budget, for five 
years, and instead of having a target that we were trying to hit ten years further 
forward, we would have a trajectory that we were trying to manage emissions around, 
so that the area under the curve was actually counted. Because what annoyed me was 
we had this 2010 target of a 20% reduction and there was no way we were going to hit 
it, but it was also pointless if we did, because you could take a really wiggly path to it 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƐĂǇ ‘ǁĞŵĂĚĞŝƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƚŚĞĞŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐĐŽƵůĚƐƚĂƌƚƌŝƐŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶ ?^Žŝƚ ?ƐĂƌĞĂůůǇ
bad way of setting policy - those point in time targets - trajectories are much better. 
What I wanted was, essentially, nine or ten budgets set out all the way to 2050 that 
would give us a clear pathway. (Worthington, interview, 21 March 2012) 
Having identified the problem, FoE was aware that political interest in climate change was 
increasing, particularly ƌĂƉŝĚůǇĂĨƚĞƌůĂŝƌ ?Ɛ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ?ƐƉĞĞĐŚƚŽďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐĂŶĚŚŝƐ 
decision to prioritise it  at the G8 Presidency and during ƚŚĞh< ?ƐhWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇ ?Climate change 
was moving centre-stage ?dŽŶǇ:ƵŶŝƉĞƌ ?&ŽŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ?ƌĞĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĂƚďĞĨŽƌĞůĂŝƌ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚ P
It was seen as an environmental issue... it led to it moving from page 7 environment 
correspondent, to page 1 political correspondent. I think that then opened a whole load 
of ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞŶ ?ƚƚŚĞƌĞďĞĨŽƌĞ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƉĂĐĞĨŽƌƌĞĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
activism. (quoted in Rutter et al 2012, p.114). 
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Worthington aired many of her ideas as lead author of &Ž ?ƐŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞ
'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŽŶŐŽŝŶŐclimate change programme review (Friends of the Earth 2005a). This 
submission criticized the bottom-up approach of the climate change programme whereby the 
projected emissions reductions arising from a disparate collection of policies were simply added 
together. Instead, Worthington made the case for a top-down approach, setting overall targets 
and then working out policies to reach the targets. Michael Jacobs, then special adviser to the 
Chancellor on environmental issues ?ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ‘The climate change programme review... 
published in spring 2006 [H.M.Government 2006] was a disastrous exercise in how not to do 
this effectively. The big insight from the [FoE] report was that you had to do it top ĚŽǁŶ ? ?
(quoted in Rutter et al 2012, p.116). 
The specific policy proposal that FoE came up with was a legal requirement to cut the 
UK ?s total carbon dioxide emissions by at least 3% every year (www.thebigask.com), which FoE 
ďĞůŝĞǀĞĚǁĂƐ ‘ĚŽĂďůĞ ?.  The idea evolved to encompass year on year cuts - to ensure cumulative 
emissions reductions and to prevent politicians delaying action while holding out for a magic 
bullet to arrive that will dramatically reduce emissions  W backed by annual targets, which 
require annual reports and therefore increased scrutiny. It was a deliberate strategic choice by 
FoE campaigners not to say how the targets should be met; specifically, to avoid a political row 
that might distract from the campaign, FoE did not reject nuclear power. In early 2005 Williams 
produced a two-page draft Bill to outline what was required (year on year cuts, annual reports 
ƚŽƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƉĞŶĂůƚŝĞƐŽŶDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐǁĂŐĞƐŝĨƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚĨĂŝůƵƌĞ). It was written as 
though it were an actual Bill, like a Private Member ?Ɛ Bill, although FoE campaigners knew that 
it would need to be a government bill given the scale and implications of the proposal. The 
campaign ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶŶŝŶŐ ‘The Big Ask ? was simple: to put pressure on individual MPs, 
primarily through constituency pressure, to persuade those MPs in turn to push their party 
leadership to adopt a Climate Change Bill.  
Thus FoE had identified developments in the problem and politics streams that 
suggested the potential for change, and provided a simple and realistic policy solution. But it 
was as yet far from clear that a genuine window of opportunity would open, and if it did, who 
or what would prise it open. 
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The Campaign 
In February 2005 FoE met other ENGOs to seek support for the idea and the campaign. WWF 
and RSPB took a  ‘wait and see ? position; Greenpeace rejected the idea (although later it 
supported it). So FoE decided to proceed alone:  ?te had a long conversation at FoE about 
whether we should be prioritising our effort on climate change... so we closed down a lot of our 
other campaigns to run  “dhe Big Ask ? ?(Juniper, quoted in Rutter et al 2012, p.114). A small 
team of personally committed, experienced staff was formed to drive the campaign forwards: 
Mike Childs, Martyn Williams, Bryony Worthington, Bastien Hibon, Anna Mitchell (media) and 
David Babbs (activism), although many more across the organization contributed huge amounts 
through the campaign. The look of the campaign was devised internally by Creative Director 
Bastien Hibon, but FoE received pro-bono support from the CHI advertising agency, which came 
up with the idea of calling the campaign  ‘The Big Ask ?. However, to secure this internal 
organisational agreement to focus resources on  ‘The Big Ask ?, it was politically necessary to 
develop a broader strategy identifying how other FoE climate activities (e.g. in transport and 
aviation) could support the campaign by underlining the need for a climate bill, even though in 
practice they were not needed. 
On 7 April 2005, one month before the general election, the draft Bill (Presentation Bill) 
was jointly introduced into Parliament by three relatively high-profile backbench members of 
the political parties, including two former ministers: Michael Meacher, former Labour 
Environment Minister; John Gummer, former Conservative Environment Secretary of State; and 
Norman Baker, Liberal Democrat environment spokesperson, thereby demonstrating cross-
party support. Soon after the Labour ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛre-election, FoE launched  ‘The Big Ask ? 
climate campaign on 25 May 2005, with Radiohead front man, Thom Yorke, calling for the 
introduction of a climate change law committing the UK to cut emissions annually by 3%; a 
cinema advertisement; and an opinion poll reporting that 73% of the public thought that the 
government wasŶ ?ƚ doing enough to tackle climate change (Friends of the Earth 2005b). A 
parliamentary petition (Early Day Motion [EDM] 178) was put down calling for new legislation.
5
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In a Channel 4 interview with Thom Yorke and Margaret Beckett, Secretary of State for 
Environment, Beckett rejected the need for a new law.  
On 13 July 2005, five days after the Gleneagles G8 summit, which had failed to deliver 
an agreement on climate change, a coalition of groups (including Help the Aged and Christian 
Aid, WWF) and MPs, coordinated by FoE, publicised details of the proposed legislation to MPs 
and journalists. Over 200 MPs had already signed EDM 178. On 29 July, a coalition of energy 
companies and ENGOs wrote to the Prime Minister demanding action on climate change; 
specifically they called for annual reduction targets to give businesses the certainty necessary 
to invest in low carbon technologies. Meanwhile, &Ž ?Ɛvolunteer local groups organised a 
series of events and activities to raise awareness and support for  ‘The Big Ask ? amongst the 
general public and MPs. Creative communications, including videos, gigs, attending festivals 
and celebrity involvement were a feature throughout the campaign and helped make it 
'aspirational'. The Cooperative Bank agreed to partner FoE in the campaign, financing a major 
report, helping fund the communications strategy and encouraging its customers to support the 
campaign. tŝĚĞƌŵŽďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĂůƐŽĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚďǇ&Ž ?ƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶt in Stop Climate Chaos 
 ?^ ? ?ĂĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶŽĨŽǀĞƌ ? ? ?ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂů ?ƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚ ?ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ĨĂŝƚŚ ?ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŐƌŽƵƉƐ
and trade unions, launched in September to campaign for policies aimed at limiting 
temperature increases to 2
0
C above pre-industrial levels. 
FoE proved effective at exploiting events to publicise the campaign. Thus, in November 
2006 it publicised the leaked draft of the GoveƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŶĞǁ climate change strategy, which 
was widely regarded as inadequate, to generate increased support for their campaign. Similarly, 
when the revised Climate Change Programme (H.M. Government 2006) was eventually 
published in March, FoE emphasised the reiterated prediction that the target of a 20% cut in 
carbon dioxide emissions by 2010 would not be met.  
Meanwhile, in December 2005 David Cameron was elected as leader of the 
Conservative Party, which proved highly significant for the campaign. Cameron embraced the 
ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂƐĂĐĞŶƚƌĂůĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚŽĨŚŝƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŽŵŽĚĞƌŶŝǌĞƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇĂŶĚ ‘ĚĞƚŽǆŝĨǇ ?ƚŚĞ
 ‘ŶĂƐƚǇ ?image of the Conservatives (Bale 2010, Carter and Clements 2015). He swiftly identified 
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the flawed Climate Change Programme as ammunition with which to attack the government. 
Almost immediately Gordon Brown invited a group of ENGO representatives to a meeting in 
Downing Street on 20 December (interviews). TŚĞŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌ ‘ƐƉƌŝŵĞŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŝĂůĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐ
obliged him ƚŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽĂŵĞƌŽŶ ?ƐŐƌĞĞŶĂŐĞŶĚĂ, starting by improving relations with the 
ENGOs (which had been poor for several years because Brown felt let down by the lack of 
support they had given him over his Climate Change Levy). Brown encouraged the ENGOs to 
suggest policy ideas and to emulate the Jubilee 2000 / Make Poverty History campaign by 
mobilising the public in support of action on climate change, thereby making it politically easier 
for the government to act.  
ƌŽǁŶ ?ƐĂĚǀŝĐĞǁĂƐŚĞĞĚĞĚ ?On 1 March 2006, the SCC coalition ŚŽƐƚĞĚĂ ‘ĂƌďŽŶ^ƉĞĞĚ
ĂƚŝŶŐ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŝŶtĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌǁŚĞƌĞ ? ?DWƐwere lobbied by their constituents. The event was 
attended by Cameron, Beckett and Liberal Democrat leader, Menzies Campbell. In May, 
ZĂĚŝŽŚĞĂĚ ?ƐdŚŽŵzŽƌŬĞĂŶĚ:ŽŶŶǇ'ƌĞĞŶǁŽŽĚƉůĂǇed  ‘The Big Ask ? concert in London, which 
was attended by Cameron and soon-to-be Environment Secretary, David Miliband. By now 
100,000 people had sent postcards requesting their MP to support a strong Climate Change Bill 
and some 300 MPs had signed EDM 178 (it seemed that around 200 postcards was sufficient to 
persuade an individual MP to sign the EDM, so FoE local groups campaigned across local 
constituencies to ensure as many MPs as possible received a large tranche of postcards). 
Another hugely significant political development saw David Miliband appointed 
Secretary of State for the Environment. Miliband was at that time a potential rival to Brown to 
succeed Blair as Labour leader:  ‘ĂŵĂŶŽŶĂŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ?ĂƐŽŶĞ&ZŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůobserved ? ‘ǁŚŽǁĂƐ
ǀĞƌǇŬĞĞŶƚŽŐĞƚƚŚŝŶŐƐĚŽŶĞĂŶĚĚŽŶĞƋƵŝĐŬůǇ ? ?tŽƌƚŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ, interview, 21 March 2012). 
Miliband was keen to take the initiative on climate change, but, initially, he was not supportive 
of a climate bill and his advisers were sceptical that this was the right option (Rutter et al 2012). 
He toyed with the idea of personal carbon budgets, floating it in a speech to the Audit 
Commission in July 2006 (Miliband 2006). However, aware that momentum was building 
behind the climate bill he asked his special advisor, Tony Grayling, to write a policy brief 
explicitly on the FoE legislative proposal and its component parts (Grayling, interview, April 
2011). 
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Perhaps ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞ ‘ŝŐƐŬ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ occurred on 
1 September 2006 when Conservative leader David Cameron shared a platform with FoE 
director Tony Juniper to call for a climate bill. Chris Huhne, Liberal Democrat environment 
spokesperson, declared his support on the same day. By now 380 MPs had backed  ‘The Big Ask ?
by signing EDM 178. FoE launched another big push to persuade remaining MPs to sign EDM 
178 and to write to the Prime Minister calling for a climate change law. Over the coming weeks 
almost every MP (620 out of 646 MPs) was lobbied personally by constituents backing the 
campaign. On 15 September Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research report, commissioned 
by FoE and the Co-operative Bank, warned that the Government had only four years to 
implement a major new programme of action to cut carbon emissions if the UK was to play its 
part in keeping global temperatures below danger levels (Bows et al 2006). The report was the 
lead item on the BBC1 10 p.m. News and  ? ?ƐNewsnight. During this period, with ministers 
constantly asked by the media whether they would introduce a climate bill, David Miliband was 
heard privately to say, ƚŚĂƚ ‘tĞĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞƐĞĞŶƚŽďĞƚŚĞŽŶůǇƉĂƌƚǇŶŽƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŚŝƐŝĚĞĂ ?
(Rutter et al 2012, p.115; several interviews).  Eventually, within six weeks of Cameron signing 
ƵƉƚŽ ‘dŚĞŝŐƐŬ ? ?DŝůŝďĂŶĚĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚŝŶWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚthat the government would introduce 
legislation to tackle climate change, although he remained non-committal on its precise format 
(The Guardian, 13 October 2006).  
With the Queen ?s Speech looming, FoE stepped up the pressure on the government to 
include a climate bill in its legislative programme. David Cameron published a model climate bill 
for the government to adopt; like FoE ?Ɛ it included annual targets, but it added an independent 
Committee on Climate Change (The Guardian, 25 October 2006). The publication of the Stern 
report on 30 October, warning of the potentially huge impact of climate change on economic 
growth, added a powerful economistic discourse alongside the scientific arguments in 
demanding swift and radical action. Over 25,000 people attended a SCC event in Trafalgar 
Square on 4 November, the largest ever UK climate change event. Some 130,000 people had 
now asked their MP to support  ‘The Big Ask ? ?ƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůĞ 412 MPs backed a strong Bill, which 
was the fifth highest total for an EDM since 1939 (HOC 2010), representing 64% of all MPs and a 
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majority in every party in Parliament. Finally, the government announced the introduction of a 
Climate Change Bill in the Queen's Speech on 15 November. 
   
The Campaign Continues: Strengthening the Bill 
The government published its draft climate change bill on 13 March 2007. FoE welcomed the 
Bill but demanded that it be strengthened significantly, calling for a more stringent reduction 
target of 80% by 2050 (a demand endorsed by other leading ENGOs), the inclusion of aviation 
and shipping emissions, and year on year targets. FoE campaigning continued to focus on 
pressurising MPs. In July, actors Jude Law and Helen Baxendale, with other celebrities, helped 
launch  ‘The Big Ask Online March ?, which enabled people to send a video message about 
climate change direct to their MP. By now more than 170,000 people had backed  ‘The Big Ask ?, 
mostly by sending postcards. Two months later FoE launched  ‘dŚĞŝŐƐŬ- ŝŐWƵƐŚ ? ?'ƌŽƵƉƐ
and supporters organised events and activities across the country to highlight the need for a 
stronger Bill, including individual lobbies of MPs.  
The Climate Change Act eventually included the first two FoE demands, although it took 
a concerted effort by campaigners and MPs of all parties to ensure that it did. The Government 
was slow to shift position. In September 2007, Gordon Brown, now Prime Minister, asked the 
new independent Committee on Climate Change (CCC) to report on whether the 60% reduction 
by 2050 target should be strengthened. The following month the new Environment Secretary, 
Hilary Benn, also asked the CCC to see if the bill should cover emissions from international 
aviation and shipping. But with little discernible progress, in June 2008 over 80 Labour 
MPs called for a tougher bill that contained the 80% target and included aviation and shipping 
emissions.  Eventually, following the recommendations of the CCC, Ed Miliband, Secretary of 
State at the new Department for Energy and Climate Change, announced in October 2006 that 
the Bill would contain the tougher 80% emission reduction target and include aviation and 
shipping emissions. 
FoE was less successful in achieving its aim of annual targets. Tony Juniper had 
welcomed the inclusion of a climate bill in the YƵĞĞŶ ?Ɛp^eech by describing it as  ‘a crucial first 
14 
 
step in ensuring the UK plays its part in keeping temperatures below danger levels. The next 
step is to ensure the bill delivers the cuts that are needed through the introduction of annual 
ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐĨŽƌƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐƚŚĞh< ?ƐĐĂƌďŽŶĚŝŽǆŝĚĞĞŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ ? ? ?BBC News, 15 November 2006). FoE 
saw annual targets as a way of stopping governments from simply blaming their predecessors 
for lack of action, which is a weakness for budget periods longer than, or cutting across, a 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛterm of office. This focus on persuading the government to accept annual targets 
had become increasingly important to FoE. Yet David DŝůŝďĂŶĚŚĂĚĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚƚŚĞƐĞƚŽďĞ ‘ƐŝůůǇ ? 
(The Guardian, 14 November 2006) because they put the government too much at the mercy of 
short-term uncontrollable events, such as a cold winter increasing fuel consumption (although 
FoE argued these could be accounted for within the annual report).  The Prime Minister 
repeated these objections to annual targets in an online debate with Juniper (BBC News, 22 
November 2006). Significantly, Bryony Worthington, who had been recruited by David Miliband 
to work as part of the drafting team in government, also regarded the FoE emphasis on annual 
targets as a distraction that missed the original key campaign objective to deliver a steady 
downward trajectory in emissions (Worthington, interview, 21 March 2012). Although the 
Government promised to set an indicative annual range of emissions within each five year 
carbon budget to act as yardsticks, it refused to accept statutory annual targets.  
On 28 October 2008, 463 MPs, including a large majority across all parties, voted in 
favour of a Climate Change Act (with just three against) that had been significantly 
strengthened since the original bill. 
 
Rolling out  ?The Big Ask ? across Europe 
The publication of the Parliamentary bill coincided with the decision by the European Council in 
March 2007 to commit the EU to ambitious climate and energy targets for 2020  W the  so-called 
 ? ? ?-20- ? ? ?ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ?European Commission 2015). Thus, ƚŚĞh< ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽĂĚŽƉƚƚŚĞ CCA 
attracted widespread interest from other member states. Mike Childs, as Chair of the Executive 
Committee of FoE Europe, began working with national FoE groups across Europe wanting to 
run campaigns for their own CCAs. The European leg of  ‘The Big Ask ? campaign was launched on 
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27 February 2008 at an event involving Thom Yorke in Brussels. FoE groups in seven European 
countries began lobbying their own governments to introduce climate change legislation. 
FoE England and Wales sought to support its sister groups across Europe. In particular, 
in an unprecedented development, it helped publicise the CCA across Europe through a series 
of jointly organized seminars, funded by the FCO and the European Climate Foundation. Mike 
Childs approached the FCO indirectly with the idea, and received a very positive response. 
Significantly, with David Miliband now Foreign Secretary, the FCO had identified climate change 
as a foreign policy priority because of its role in energy security, the potential economic 
opportunities it offered UK businesses and the scope to use the concept of carbon budgets to 
engage with overseas finance and economic ministries. The FCO had carried out a GAP Analysis 
that had identified only very patchy support across Europe from governments, business and the 
public for action on climate change. dŚĞh< ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŚĂĚĚĞŵonstrated the 
importance of securing cross-party support for proactive climate policy. The FCO saw the 
seminar series as a way of encouraging governments to consider climate change legislation, 
getting businesses to recognize the benefits of a transition to a low carbon economy and the 
potential benefits of securing first mover advantage in this field, and to encourage a 
groundswell of activity pushing in that direction from civil society. The seminars, backed by a 
joint FCO/FoE video, sought to explain the key features of the CCA and demonstrate the 
existence of a broad coalition of interests that supported it, whilst showcasing ƚŚĞh< ?Ɛ
commitment to action on GHGs.  
Through 2009-2010 there were seminars involving FoE in Budapest, Berlin, Madrid, 
Dublin, Warsaw, Helsinki, Vienna, Prague and Riga; meanwhile, the FCO organised events with 
different civil society representation in Mexico, Vietnam, Taiwan, Thailand and Indonesia. The 
panel of speakers typically consisted of a senior DECC official, a minister or senior advisor, a 
business representative and a FoE spokesperson. This UK input was matched by a panel from 
the host country with similar representation to provide local context and to stimulate debate. 
These half/full day seminars typically attracted 60-80 participants encompassing ministers, 
government officials, business chief executives, foreign ambassadors, high-profile journalists 
and leading NGOs from both the environment and development movements. &ƌŽŵƚŚĞ&K ?Ɛ
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perspective these seminars were a low-budget strand of its wider climate diplomacy strategy. 
The FCO did not expect to secure immediate legislative changes, but measured by local media 
attention, the good mix of participants and sometimes substantive follow-up involving the FCO 
providing advice and support in drafting legislation, the programme was judged to be 
successful.  
However, &Ž ?Ɛefforts to promote climate legislation encountered strong resistance in 
the wake of the economic and financial crisis that swept across Europe and pushed climate 
down the agenda. It also proved difficult to mount similar individual MP-focused campaigns in 
countries with electoral systems based around party lists. Even initially-promising campaigns 
struggled. In Hungary, for example, the FCO/FoE seminar contributed to the development of a 
draft climate bill that attracted the support of over 400 civil society groups and the 
Parliamentary Environment Committee but, facing strong opposition from the fossil fuel lobby, 
the ruling socialist government pulled the bill just before the April 2010 general election (Justice 
and Environment 2011, p.5). The election of the rightwing Fidesz government ended any 
prospect of climate change legislation. Elsewhere, there were active FoE campaigns in several 
countries, although FoE groups were much smaller and had fewer resources than their UK 
counterpart. Eventually, climate change legislation of varying strengths was passed in Austria 
(2011), Denmark (2014), Finland (2015), Ireland (2015), Sweden (2017), with legislation 
promised in Norway; the influence of domestic campaigns over these legislative initiatives is 
beyond our remit here. 
 
Coupling the streams together 
The CCA represented a ƌĂĚŝĐĂůƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞh< ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽĐůŝŵĂƚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞ. As Carter 
and Jacobs (2014) have argued, this change came about because developments in the climate 
change problem and politics streams combined to open a window of opportunity for radical 
policy change. ƐƚŚĞǇĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞ ? ‘dŚĞŝŐƐŬ ?ǁĂƐŽŶůǇŽŶĞĨĂĐƚŽƌin this process; the rapid 
emergence of climate change as a compelling problem reflected a combination of strengthening 
science, high-ƉƌŽĨŝůĞĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?ƚŚĞ' ?ƐƵŵŵŝƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞůĞĂƐĞŽĨů'ŽƌĞ ?ƐĨŝůŵAn 
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Inconvenient Truth, the publication of the Stern Report), escalating media coverage of climate 
change, and worsening UK emission trends. Meanwhile, significant developments in the politics 
stream  W notably, rising public concern, ENGO campaigning, Cameron ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ as Conservative 
leader with a progressive green agenda, the appointment of David Miliband as Environment 
Secretary, increasing pressure from the business community  W combined to ratchet up pressure 
for government action on climate change. However, as the window of opportunity for change 
opened in the problem and politics streams, Friends of the Earth made a radical policy solution, 
the Climate Change Bill, available to policymakers (see also Lorenzoni and Benson 2014).   
dŚĞĂďŽǀĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨ ‘dŚĞŝŐƐŬ ?ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ&Ž ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞǁĂƐƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚ
because it contributed to the growing pressure for change in all three streams and, crucially, it 
played an effective policy entrepreneurial role by coupling the three streams together. Within 
ƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐƚƌĞĂŵ ?ƌǇŽŶǇtŽƌƚŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?ƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨthe 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛfailure to deliver 
emission reduction targets and her presentation of a radically different approach to climate 
ƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶ&Ž ?ƐƐƵďŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĐůŝŵĂƚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƌĞǀŝĞǁ(FoE 2005a) played a 
critical role in focusing the attention of policy elites on the need to improve UK climate policy. 
FoE then provided a simple but radical solution: a climate change bill with statutory targets, 
carbon budgets and annual emissions reductions. By targeting MPs across all parties through an 
 ‘ĂƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ‘ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ, FoE was able to stimulate bottom-up pressure within the three major 
parties. But the real political coup was to persuade David Cameron to support the bill. FoE 
utilised its ŐŽŽĚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐǁŝƚŚ ‘ŐƌĞĞŶƚŚŝŶŬĞƌƐ ?ĂĐƌŽƐƐĂůůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐĂŶĚpursued an insider 
strategy to influence people close to Cameron. The Labour government, under growing 
pressure from the media and public opinion to act on climate change, and facing opposition 
parties unified in demanding a bill, quickly caved in. What emerged was an unprecedented 
cross-ƉĂƌƚǇ ‘ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ? involving ĂůůƚŚƌĞĞŵĂũŽƌƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽ ‘ŽƵƚ-ŐƌĞĞŶ ?ĞĂĐŚ
other on climate change and the environment, a window that remained open for several years 
(Carter and Jacobs 2014, p.137). Subsequently, FoE worked closely with cross-party MPs and 
the wider ENGO movement to maintain pressure on the government to strengthen the bill 
considerably as it  passed through Parliament, notably by ĞŵďƌĂĐŝŶŐ&Ž ?ƐĚĞŵĂŶĚƐĨŽƌƚŽƵŐŚĞƌ
reduction targets and the inclusion of shipping and aviation emissions. 
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Although it is very ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽ ‘ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ?ƚŚĞĞǆĂĐƚĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĂŶǇŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů
actor exercises over a decision, people closely involved in policymaking at the time certainly 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ&Ž ?ƐƌŽůĞĂƐĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ?ƐŶŽƚĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?ĂǀŝĚDŝůŝďĂŶĚƉƵďůŝĐůǇĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚ&Ž ?Ɛ 
ƌŽůĞŽŶƚŚĞĚĂǇŽĨƚŚĞYƵĞĞŶ ?Ɛ^ƉĞĞĐŚ ?ĂǀŝĞǁůĂƚĞƌĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚƉƌŝǀĂƚĞůǇďǇŚŝƐƐƉĞĐŝĂůĂĚǀŝƐŽƌ
(Grayling, interview, April 2011).  An Institute for Government (Rutter et al 2012) policy reunion 
seminar attended by many of the key actors endorsed this viewƉŽŝŶƚ ?dŚĞ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞĚŝƚŽƌ ?
EŝĐŬZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐĂǁƚŚĞƉĂƌƚƉůĂǇĞĚďǇ&ŽĂƐĂŵĂũŽƌŶĞǁƐǁŽƌƚŚǇĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞYƵĞĞŶ ?Ɛ
Speech: 
WĞŽƉůĞŽĨƚĞŶƐĂǇ ‘ĚŽĞƐĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐĐŚĂŶŐĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?tĞůůŝƚŚĂƐŚĞƌĞ ?&ƌŝĞŶĚƐŽĨƚŚĞĂƌƚŚ
did a rising campaign for a Climate Change Bill. Ministers pooh-poohed the idea. What is 
ƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨĂŝůůƚŚĞǇƐĂŝĚ ?/ƚǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚďĞǁŽƌƚŚƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌŝƚŝƐǁƌŝƚƚĞŶŽŶ ?dŚĞŶĂǀŝĚ
ĂŵĞƌŽŶĂĚŽƉƚĞĚŝƚĂƐŚŝƐŬĞǇƚŚĞŵĞ ?DĞŶǌŝĞƐĂŵƉďĞůů ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚďŝŐƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚ
was on green taxes and MinisƚĞƌƐŚĂǀĞŐƌĂĚƵĂůůǇƐĂŝĚ ‘KŚ ?ůĞƚ ?ƐŚĂǀĞĂŝůů ? ? ? ?EĞǁƐ
15 November 2006) 
 
Academic studies of the period support these assessments (Lockwood 2013, Carter and 
Jacobs 2014, Lorenzoni and Benson 2014). 
When considering the reasons for the success of this campaign, it is important to note 
that in several respects  ‘dŚĞŝŐƐŬ ?ǁĂƐŶŽƚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞ ?It was an established 
Westminster-focused approach that built on the experiences of previous FoE campaigns 
supporting legislation on Home Energy Conservation, Road Traffic Reduction and Warm Homes 
and Energy Conservation. These campaigns were much less successful, but they provided 
significant lessons: specifically, the design of the proposed Climate Change Bill was based on 
annual targets (rather than a single 15-year target) and its objective was a Government Bill 
rather than a Private Member's Bill (Martin Williams, personal correspondence, 16 June 2016). 
The emphasis on constituency-based campaigning to pressure MPs to support the Bill was well 
established, so the procedures were in place to implement it and the local activists were 
familiar with the approach.  
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What was new for FoE was the scale of the operation: rather than running a suite of 
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐŽĨǀĂƌǇŝŶŐƐŝǌĞƐ ? ‘dhe Big Ask ? became the focus of attention within the national 
organization. Ɛ ‘dhe Big Ask ? gathered momentum, it rapidly absorbed almost all the available 
FoE campaigning resources, nationally and locally. Campaign organizers were surprised at the 
speed of progress. The original internal objectives agreed in late 2004 targetted 15,000 people 
to be signed up by the end of 2007 and the passage of a strong climate bill by 2010. Yet, by the 
end of 2005 the campaign team was sufficiently confident to revise these targets dramatically 
to 40,000 people signed up by the end of 2006 and the introduction of a strong bill by 2007. 
These revised objectives were all met. dŚĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƐŽŵĂŶǇƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ‘ŶĞǁ ?
activists, in the campaign was a major achievement. The number of local FoE groups increased 
during the period from about 185 to around 224.  
A second distinctive feature was the widespread use of celebrities. Most notably, Thom 
Yorke ?Ɛinvolvement generated great enthusiasm from the FoE communications team as they 
recognised they had a valuable asset for mobilising grassroots activism, especially amongst 
younger supporters (Nulman 2015, p.122). His presence attracted other celebrities later in the 
campaign, especially during the passage of the Bill through Parliament, including the band 
Razorlight and actors Gillian Anderson, Stephen Fry and Helen Baxendale. The combination of 
gigs, interviews and celebrity endorsements throughout the campaign provided an aspirational 
feel and helped promote ƚŚĞ ‘ŝŐƐŬ ?ƐůŽŐĂŶ ? 
Not every campaign demand was achieved and not every component of the campaign 
worked well. For example, tŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘dŚĞŝŐƐŬ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ǁĂƐƌĂƚŚĞƌ
ambivalent. There was clearly an element of turf war, with FoE keen to protect what it saw as 
its innovative idea and campaign,while SCC was split over its support for  ‘The Big Ask ? and more 
generally struggled to identify its role. Nevertheless, a year or so into the campaign FoE did 
start to work more closely with (parts of) the SCC.  
More significant, however, was &Ž ?ƐĨĂŝůƵƌĞto find an equally attractive follow-up 
campaign to maintain the momentum generated by  ‘dhe Big Ask ?, mobilizing and retaining its 
new recruits and local groups. Institutional factors and internal organizational politics played an 
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important part here. The early decision to concentrate most resources on  ‘dhe Big Ask ? in a way 
that proved necessary to sustain the campaign, but would never have been approved internally 
at the outset,  caused some discontent amongst other campaigning teams within the national 
organization whose own work on, for example, food and farming, was inevitably hampered by 
this strategy.  ‘dhe Big Ask ? campaign strategy included several site campaigns, especially on 
aviation and transport, in an attempt to address these objections.  However, in practice, little 
effort was allocated to these activities because they were a lower priority than the core 
campaign for a Bŝůů ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂƚĞƵƉƚŚĞůŝŽŶ ?ƐƐŚĂƌĞŽĨƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨ ‘The Big 
Ask ? produced a grudging acceptance amongst internal dissenters that this central focus had to 
be sustained, the underlying assumption was that resources would eventually flow back to 
other campaigning issue areas. When FoE  debated internally how it should follow up  ‘dhe Big 
Ask ?, campaigners arguing that the priority should be to help implement the new CCA in specific 
sectors, such as renewable energy, or at local level, in cities and local authorities, were 
countered by a demand that the focus should shift on to nature and biodiversity. The strong 
internal pressure for FoE to return to being a general campaigning ENGO rather than a climate 
change organization resulted in the decision to run campaigns on tropical rainforests and on 
the food chain, mixed with a renewed emphasis on smaller campaigns that would engage local 
activists. Subsequent campaigns on bees and opposing fracking have also tried to move away 
from using activists simply as  ‘ĨŽŽƚ-ƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ ?doing little more than lobbying local MPs, to 
embracing a fuller role. Thus the bee campaign encouraged members to carry out a range of 
actions in their own gardens and communities, while the campaign against fracking encourages 
members to target local authorities in an exercise in local empowerment. 
It was always going to be difficult foƌ&ŽƚŽĨŽůůŽǁƚŚĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨ ‘dhe Big Ask ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
had benefited from problem and politics windows opening together. Environmental issues 
rapidly declined in salience in the wake of the financial and economic crisis. But subsequent 
campaigning strategy was in part shaped by internal organizational politics, perhaps to the 
detriment of maintaining the positive momentum that had been built up around climate 
change. Even the decision to drop  ‘dŚĞ ‘ŝŐƐŬ ? slogan and replace it with  ‘>Ğƚ ?ƐŐĞƚƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ
ĂďŽƵƚĐůŝŵĂƚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? was probably unwise, given the name recognition that the former had 
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acquired - and the lack of impact of its replacement. Thus FoE struggled with the tensions 
arising from its high-profile success in one area of its activities, climate change, which 
challenged its raisŽŶĚ ?ĞƚƌĞĂƐĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝƐƚĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶďĂƐĞĚŽŶƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŽƌǇ
member activism.   
Finally, when FoE tried to take the campaign further afield it met with less immediate 
success. In part, this outcome reflected the different circumstances elsewhere, including the 
generally smaller and weaker sister FoE groups. But it was also a matter of timing as the roll-out 
was soon followed by the financial and economic crisis. In short, the window of opportunity had 
closed. Nevertheless, the existence of the CCA has itself led to other groups and institutions 
promoting the idea of climate change laws across the globe, including WWF, the FCO and the 
Grantham Institute (2015). Whether or not FoE ?ƐĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶŐled indirectly to CCAs in those 
countries that have adopted them is a subject for further research.  
 
Conclusion 
 ‘The Big Ask ? was an undoubted success. Friends of the Earth was able to exploit the moment in 
the climate change issue attention cycle (2006-2008) of alarmed (re)discovery when the public, 
media, business community and policymakers together became exercised by the problem. The 
application of the multiple streams framework shows how FoE contributed to the opening of 
this window of opportunity by ratcheting up pressure in the problem and politics streams, and 
then coupled the three streams together through an innovative policy solution and active 
lobbying, which resulted in the path-breaking Climate Change Act 2008. FoE identified a 
compelling problem, presented a simple but radical solution, and skillfully exploited the party 
politics surrounding the Blair/Brown transition, the ascendancy of David Miliband and, crucially, 
ĂŵĞƌŽŶ ?ƐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞŵŽĚĞƌŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?&ŽƉůĂǇĞĚƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌƌŽůĞ
extremely effectively. This timing was certainly partly fortuitous, but FoE was able to seize to 
the opportunity skilfully and play a critical role in delivering policy change.  
The campaign strategy had several strengths. It was focused on a single outcome: 
securing a climate change bill. The demand for a bill was appealing because it required 
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government action that did not immediately impose costs on individuals (although the resulting 
policies required to cut emissions would of course have consequences for individuals and 
businesses), and it was possible to build Parliamentary support precisely because the measure 
was detached from claims or demands that could have alienated potential supporters (for 
example, by rejecting nuclear power). The campaign focus on lobbying individual MPs neatly 
ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ&Ž ?Ɛtraditional capacity for mobilizing its grassroots activists and the wider public 
with a more traditional insider strategy carried out to great effect by parliamentary lobbyists 
working at the centre. An impressive range of campaigning techniques, including celebrities, 
gigs, videos and commissioned reports was employed. As a senior official from another ENGO 
commented at the time:  ‘It's done their positioning a world of good. Put them closer to 
policymaking. The fact that they captured part of the Tory Party to promote it was impressive. 
Unlikely bedfellows  W ƐŚŽǁƐƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚŽƉƚŝŵŝƐŵ QŝƚŵĂĚĞƚŚĞŵůŽŽŬŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞ
ƉůĂǇĞƌƐƚŚĂŶƐŚŽƵƚĞƌƐ ? (FoE internal report). This comment has contemporary resonance for FoE 
and its fellow major ENGOs who have ůĂƵŶĐŚĞĚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĞĞŶĞƌh< ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶĚ
promote environmental protection in a context where Brexit means that UK environmental and 
climate change policy is facing huge uncertainty and instability. It is an opportune moment for 
ENGOs to reflect on past experience about the importance of problem framing, offering 
realistic policy solutions, and building cross-party consensus. 
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Notes  
                                                          
1
 For an exception, see Nulman (2015). 
2
 One of the authors of this article, Mike Childs, was one of the campaign organisers and we 
draw on his knowledge of events. 
3
 One recent example is Mintrom and Luetjens (2017). 
4
 Both Carter and Jacobs (2014) and Lorenzoni and Benson (2014) also apply the MSF in their 
wider analyses of the CCA. 
5
 An EDM is a mechanism used by MPs to draw attention to an issue or event. 
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